International Force in Gaza Risks Becoming ‘UNIFIL 2,’ Retired General Warns

Jerusalem, 5 November, 2025 (TPS-IL) -- (Adnkronos) – The United States has circulated a draft resolution that the UN Security Council could discuss in the coming days. At its core, it would establish an International Security Force (ISF) in Gaza, with a mandate of at least two years and the possibility of extension until 2027. The force — defined by the United States as “enforcement, not peacekeeping,” according to Axios — would be tasked with ensuring security in the Strip, disarming Hamas, stabilizing the borders with Israel and Egypt, and training a new Palestinian police force. Political coordination would be overseen by the so-called “Board of Peace,” a transitional body that Donald Trump himself intends to chair. According to the American media, countries ready to contribute troops include Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Egypt, and Turkey.

Adnkronos spoke about it with Giorgio Cuzzelli, professor of security and strategic studies at Lumsa in Rome and a retired Alpine general.

General, let’s start with the terms: what’s the difference between an intervention force and a peacekeeping force? And what is known today about this contingent for Gaza?

Very little. Let’s examine what is known: the peace plan envisages about twenty successive steps, each of which presupposes the consent of Israel, Hamas, and the intervention of third parties, primarily the United States.

But we know neither the political nor the military mandate of this interposition force, and therefore not even the rules of engagement. It is supposed to guarantee security on the ground and allow a transitional commission to govern the Strip, but everything remains hypothetical. If Washington indeed takes the issue to the Security Council, only a UN resolution will be able to define whether it will be peacekeeping — based on consensus, neutrality, and the limited use of force, only for self-defense — or an enforcement force, an expression of American will. But for now, everything remains unclear.

There’s talk of a contingent with countries like Egypt, Turkey, and Azerbaijan. How realistic is that?

Not much. Turkey, despite offering its services, is unwelcome to Israel, which does not want former imperial powers in Palestine or Ankara’s interference in an area crucial to its security. The Gulf States lack the military capacity to sustain such a mission. The Egyptians do, but they are unlikely to want to take on such a thankless task, attacking Hamas on behalf of the United States and Israel.

Paradoxically, only Pakistan remains : the only Sunni Islamic nuclear power with experience in UN operations and which would require Washington’s legitimacy. The Pakistanis could be the only ones with the strength for a leading role. It is no coincidence that the Army Chief of Staff toured the area…

And a possible Western participation, perhaps Italian?

It would be more of a risk than an opportunity. Israel doesn’t want Western soldiers on the ground, and Hamas obviously doesn’t either, and in Arab countries, accusations of neocolonialism are always lurking. The only exceptions could be countries already present in Lebanon, but only under a clear American umbrella.

Without a political framework guaranteed by the United States—or the United Nations, which is the Italian position — no one will take the risk of committing their soldiers to a mission with uncertain contours. It’s enough to remember how UNIFIL was born, and how it (hasn’t) evolved : formally, it was supposed to support the disarmament of Hezbollah, but it never had the means or the mandate. And during the years of the UN peacekeepers, up until the post-October 7th, the Lebanese militia became more powerful than ever.

So are we risking a new UNIFIL case in Gaza too?

Absolutely, if the mandate isn’t crystal clear. And there’s an additional problem: we’re not talking about a potential adversary like Hezbollah here, but an active enemy, Hamas, which has no intention of disarming or relinquishing control of the Strip. Without its formal surrender, no peacekeeping force will be able to guarantee stability or security. The American plan rests on a very delicate balance: ceasefire, disarmament of Hamas, interposition, and the start of reconstruction. But if one step is missed, everything falls apart.

Qataris and Saudis forced Hamas to sign Trump’s agreement, and the Arab League declared that Gaza’s future will not include the terrorist movement. Is this a sign of rupture?

It’s a step forward, but consistency is needed. In the narrative of many Islamic countries, Hamas is not a terrorist group but a symbol of national resistance. The Gulf monarchies and moderate Arab countries will have to withstand the pressure of their own public opinion. The real crux is this: how can a Muslim country “strike” someone who, in the Arab world, is perceived as a martyr for Palestinian independence?

Realistically: will this international force ever see the light of day?

Washington will push for the resolution to be approved. But with whom, and according to what rules, we don’t know. We know that American troops are already in Israel, and that January is being discussed for a possible deployment. But until there is a clear and shared political mandate, it’s all just talk. Without clarity on tasks and rules of engagement, even the most powerful forces risk failure.